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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this essay is to review the latest edition of Cohen
and Varat,1 its strengths and weaknesses. Ironically, Professor Cohen
reviewed the original edition2 in 1960, concluding it was "easily the
best and most teachable collection of cases on constitutional problems
in print .... It deserves to be widely used."3 After teaching from it
for seven years, I know it well enough to state unequivocally that it is
a first-rate teaching tool-unquestionably one of the leading, traditional
casebooks--enabling thousands of law students throughout the country
to gain some insight on a vast array of constitutional questions.
Below, rather than simply describe the casebook's broad contents,
I also want to illustrate how I use it in a class of 65 to 100 students,
meeting for 50 minutes per class, 60 times during a semester, hoping
perhaps to assist another new teacher embarking on understanding and
presenting the mysteries of constitutional decision-making, many of
which still evade me.
t Professor of Law, Stanford Law School.
f Professor of Law, UCLA Law School.
* Professor of Law, The University of Alabama School of Law. I wish to thank Dean
Kenneth C. Randall and the Edward Brett Randolph Fund for research grant support, and the
Alabama Law Foundation for its continuing support of research by Alabama faculty.
1. WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN D. VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS (10th ed. 1997).
2. The first edition appeared in 1959. EDWARD L. BARRETT, JR. ET AL., CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS (1959). Barrett and Bruton prepared the fourth edition.
After Bruton's retirement from teaching, Barrett edited the fifth edition alone. Cohen became a
coeditor of the substantially revised sixth edition, and Varat joined as coeditor on the eighth
edition.
3. William Cohen & Arvo Van Alstyne, Book Review, 48 CAL. L. REV. 173 (1960).
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Preliminarily, Cohen and Varat is long, and I do not attempt to
race through its 1900 pages. Nor do I follow the editors' organiza-
tional framework or my same syllabus each year. Instead, I start over,
creating a new syllabus which more accurately reflects my interest in
subject matter coverage and what I can reasonably expect students to
accomplish for the course. My scholarship also informs my course; as
it evolves, so does my presentation and critique.
True to the editors' plan, Cohen and Varat is quite flexible,
allowing the teacher to change organizational presentation. I take full
advantage of this flexibility. In the spring of 1998, for example, I
began the course with religion materials in Chapter 17 because of the
current relevance of those issues in Alabama and because the initial
religion cases introduce a number of broad themes that we will cover
in more detail later. Other times, I have started with incorporation
issues in Chapter 8 or judicial review in Chapter 1.
Moreover, I have supplemented the casebook with film segments
of Eyes on the Prize, Women in American Life, and other educational
documentaries that illustrate significant constitutional contradictions
that have plagued this nation. I have been aided here by colleagues on
the law faculty and the Women Studies Department to incorporate
more fully, for example, the voices and experiences of diverse women,
hopefully enriching the learning experience and environment for all my
students.
For especially ambiguous materials I recommend that my students
consult John Nowak and Ron Rotunda's excellent treatise.4  I
discourage them from relying solely on commercial outlines, explaining
that the primary value of an outline is in its production. I also permit
them to use their own outlines during the final exam.
My students have also provided constructive feedback about their
needs, helping me improve the course. More than any other request,
they want practice exercises, as many as I will provide. To aid my
students, I brief the first case, illustrating how I read, analyzed, and
distilled the case into the brief. I then assign each of them a case to
brief in writing and to present to the rest of the class. As time
permits, I have the students join me at a podium in front of the class.
Beyond briefing, we use some class time to apply the cases to
practice questions. As we end each unit, I distribute sample questions
testing material covered to that point. My goal is to encourage my
students to keep up, applying the cases as we proceed through the
material. I take the first question and illustrate how I would read the
4. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 1995).
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question and how I would apply the cases. Thereafter, I ask my
students to apply the cases to resolve the questions.
My course today is quite different from seven years ago, even
though I have not adopted a different book. Indeed, only now do I
know how well Cohen and Varat teaches. The best way to describe
my Constitutional Law course, then, is as a work in progress that
undoubtedly will benefit from this structural and substantive examina-
tion of Cohen and Varat.
Part One of this review explains my journey from law student to
Constitutional Law teacher, and my selection of Cohen and Varat.
Part Two examines Cohen and Varat as a teaching tool. In a word, it
has proven excellent on most counts for that purpose and I recommend
it highly. Part Three assesses the casebook's principal weaknesses,
which I have found limited; and it offers suggestions for improvement,
consistent with the goals set forth by the casebook's editors.
I. REALIZING A DREAM
As a UCLA law student fifteen years ago, one of my favorite, yet
most difficult courses was Professor Ken Karst's Survey of American
Constitutional Law. I went to law school expecting to learn about
elusive concepts like fairness and equality, especially from reading
Supreme Court decisions. Most of all, I wanted to examine how
African Americans had been excluded from basic privileges of
American citizenship despite written" constitutional safeguards. Much
to my disappointment, the course was not designed for those specific
purposes, but rather as a broad introduction to judicial interpretation
and constitutional analysis. This alternate emphasis made the course
much less interesting and more difficult to prepare for.
An additional obstacle was deciphering Gerald Gunther's gigantic
casebook.' Its rich historical detail and extensive intellectual probing
on seemingly esoteric points left me scratching my head or dozing off
midpage. I was overwhelmed by its breadth (nearly 2000 pages with
the supplement) and had neither the background experience nor the
time to contextualize many of its exhaustive notes. Perhaps Gunther
had in mind a broader audience than first- and second-year law
students. Nonetheless, I ended that course as weary from the
supplemental questions and notes as from the Court's long, often
tortuous, opinions.
5. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS (10th ed.
1980).
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Fortunately, Karst gently guided his students through the
labyrinth of judicial review, justiciability, separation of powers,
federalism, due process, equal protection, and First Amendment cases,
lecturing both on the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, as
well as on the Court itself. Although Karst's lectures were intellectual-
ly sumptuous, revealing careful preparation and free thinking, they
rarely afforded students opportunities to leave the sidelines to contest
and debate him, the Court, or one another concerning the important
constitutional dilemmas presented in virtually every case. Thus, I
cannot say what many of my classmates thought about federalism,
abortion, prayer in public school, or affirmative action, for example.
I can state with certainty that within study groups, student organiza-
tions, and clandestine exchanges, my classmates had much to say.
Moreover, just below the surface of that safe classroom environment
fomented deep-seated hostilities and misperceptions.
Even though, at that time, I had no idea that I would later lead
law students over much of the same terrain, I regretted the passive
classroom format. And, not surprisingly, I eschew it now, preferring
to let my students hear from each other, and from me, no matter how
controversial the topic. Pedagogically, I think students learn by
participating actively: presenting, debating, and responding.
Despite the fact that I rarely lecture, I owe Professor Karst an
enormous debt, taking from him memories of a conscientious, model
teacher, who made himself available to students despite his prolific
scholarship demands.6 I also took from him a keen interest in the
Court as the final arbiter of constitutional justice and a profound
concern about the Court's membership. Indeed, my central lesson was
that the Constitution means what five Justices decide, making it
critically important who is appointed to the Court.
My passion for constitutional law was reignited after writing a
review of Derrick Bell's And We Are Not Saved,7 his searing, allegori-
cal examination of American constitutional history. I was so moved by
Bell's penetrating analysis of constitutional inequality and its relevance
to what I call the late twentieth century's constitutional retrogression,
that, more than anything else, I wanted to teach Constitutional Law
6. Indeed, perhaps the greatest benefit of attending UCLA was the remarkable collection
of master teachers, many of whom I have borrowed from in my own teaching.
7. DERRICK A. BELL, JR., AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR
RACIAL JUSTICE (1987).
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and contribute to the tremendously important and exciting critique
already underway by Bell, Richard Delgado, and others.8
At that time, I was Co-Director of the UCLA Academic Support
Program, designing programs to improve student retention and bar
passage, work that I found enormously inspiring and important to the
legal academy. I would only give it up if I could find an entry level
position teaching Constitutional Law. I informed Dean Susan
Westerberg Prager of my goal and enlisted her assistance along with
that of other colleagues at UCLA. I registered for the annual AALS
Hiring Conference and, after extensive interviews, received a delightful
offer from The University of Alabama to begin there as an assistant
professor teaching Constitutional Law courses. My elation with the
offer was tempered heavily by my departure from my wonderful,
steady friends and familiar surroundings in Los Angeles, but Tusca-
loosa promised a world of new challenges, and more important, a
supportive, collegial environment in which I could tackle the jurispru-
dential and doctrinal intricacies of constitutional law.
8. Bell's work has remained very influential to mine. DERRICK A. BELL, JR., FACES AT
THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992); DERRICK A. BELL, JR.,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS (1997) (his new casebook). Indeed, I have used his first casebook
in my course on Racism and the Law. DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN
LAW (3d ed. 1992).
More recently, Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic have made a major contribution to my
intellectual growth, producing literally hundreds of articles, book reviews, and books about law's
victims and law's power. I shall not catalogue here all their provocative and elegant writing, but
do include some of those related to this review, especially the tendency of many white casebook
editors to ignore critical scholarship by nonwhites. Delgado and Stefancic have helped me think
beyond traditional boxes and introduced me to the work of critical legal scholars. More precisely,
they have collaborated on a series of cutting-edge books and readers, establishing themselves as
one of the most prolific scholarly teams in legal education today. Richard Delgado, Why
Universities are Morally Obligated to Strive for Diversity: Restoring the Remedial Rationale for
Affirmative Action, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1165 (1997); Richard Delgado, The Colonial Scholar:
Do Outsider Authors Replicate the Citation Practices of the Insiders, But in Reverse, 71 CHI. -KENT
L. REV. 969 (1996); Jean Stefancic & Richard Delgado, Outsider Scholars: The Early Stories, 71
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1001 (1996); Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School: A Reply to
Farber and Sherry, 46 VAND. L. REV. 665 (1993); Richard Delgado, The Inward Turn in Outsider
Jurisprudence, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 741 (1993); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images
of the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?,
77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258 (1992); Richard Delgado, Legal Scholarship: Insiders, Outsiders,
Editors, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 717 (1992); Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How
to Marginalize Outsider Writing, Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1992); Jean Stefancic
& Richard Delgado, Outsider Jurisprudence and the Electronic Revolution: Will Technology Help
or Hinder the Cause of Law Reform?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 847 (1991); Robert M. O'Neil & Richard
Delgado, A Reaction to 'The Imperial Scholar' and Professor Delgado's Proposed Solution, 3 LAW
& INEQ. J. 255 (1985); Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil
Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984).
1998]
Seattle University Law Review
As a new teacher, my first significant hurdle was to select a
casebook for my survey course. Casebook publishers generously make
their products available for examination at no cost, so I had no
shortage of options to review that summer. Another choice would have
been to create my own materials, perhaps leading to yet another entry
in the casebook wars. I simply did not know enough about constitu-
tional law yet to undertake preparation of my own materials. The
more traditional approach (the one I followed), is for new, junior
teachers to consult more senior colleagues to identify what books they
have used and to seek out their advice. After those visits, I was
confident I could select any book, but my colleagues then preferred
those by Barrett, Cohen, and Varat (now Cohen and Varat)9 and by
Gunther (now Gunther and Sullivan)."° Finally, because constitution-
al law at Alabama was taught in two separate courses by a combination
of four professors, I had some incentive to select one of the preferred
books so that my students would not have to purchase different ones
for each course.
I chose Cohen and Varat for several reasons. First, my summer
review did not persuade me that Gunther's book had changed
substantially (although I am confident the recent addition of Professor
Kathleen Sullivan as a co-editor on the thirteenth edition will rapidly
make it a more effective teaching tool). Plus, my review of Cohen and
Varat was enjoyable. The careful, well organized foundational work of
Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Paul W. Bruton, and John Honnold, the
original editors, has evolved now over four decades (Barrett participat-
ing in eight editions through 1989). When Cohen joined the sixth
edition, he and Barrett had between them over fifty years in the
classroom.
This tenth edition is another articulate distillation of all that
experience and more, and those of us who use such works owe much
to these accomplished teachers and their teachers. I especially liked the
brief yet frequent historical notes throughout the book introducing
sections and chapters, and the editors' efforts to pose probing questions
between the primary cases. The book was long but not overwhelming.
It seemed immensely more readable than Gunther.
More importantly, my new colleague, Martha Morgan, the other
primary constitutional law teacher, with whom I was looking forward
9. Edward L. Barrett, Jr., was one of the three editors on the first edition of what is now
COHEN & .ARAT. He remained an active editor through the 8th edition. EDWARD L.
BARRETT, JR. ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (8th ed. 1989).
10. GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (13th ed.
1997).
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to collaborating, used Cohen and Varat. I thought it would be wise to
adopt a book that she had substantial experience teaching from. When
I reached especially thorny problems, I could turn to her. Finally, Jon
Varat had been my friend and colleague at UCLA, and I was confident
that I could call on his assistance, if necessary. It simply could not
hurt to know personally one of the editors. In retrospect, my reasons
for selecting it still seem valid.
II. TEACHING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW WITH
COHEN AND VARAT
According to the editors, their primary goal is "to provide a book
that is at the same time intellectually challenging and flexible enough
to be used by law teachers with widely varying approaches to the
material."" That goal is achieved by providing "the raw materi-
als-cases, constitutional provisions, and statutes-allowing teachers
maximum freedom to pursue their own teaching strategies and
requiring students to create their own generalizations from the
materials."' 2  The casebook is far more than a shell containing the
leading cases. It is clearly planned, generously edited and pruned, and
written so that students can read it and construct a general understand-
ing of constitutional doctrine, without inescapable resort to numerous
uneven secondary sources, especially commercial outlines.
From the first prefatory note to the final appendix on the Justices
of the Court, Cohen and Varat carefully move their readers through
seventeen chapters of raw materials on constitutional doctrine,
supplementing the principal cases with helpful introductions, back-
ground notes relating relevant historical, economic, and social context,
and discussions and questions from scholarly writing and inconsistent
opinions.
One of the best characteristics of their casebook is a rigorous
organization. There are four large parts that introduce broad themes:
the role and authority of the Court; the constitutional allocation of
governmental powers; individual rights; and First Amendment
doctrine. Each part contains a series of closely-related chapters,
allowing significant opportunities for students to compare and
distinguish analogous materials. This structure aids teaching without
creating too false a sense of rigid analytic categories.
Chapter 1 sensibly sets out the Constitution of the United States
as originally proposed and the twenty-seven amendments added
11. COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at v.
12. Id.
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between 1791 and 1992. I regularly begin my course by reviewing the
Constitution primarily because many law students have never read it,
yet most think they know what it says and what it means. Reading it
with my students also allows me an opportunity to address constitu-
tional contradictions as early as the first class meeting. Finally, before
students read any cases, I can point out to them the handful of clauses
that will occupy most of our time.
In addition to a readable reprint of the Constitution, the editors
provide a historical note on the adoption of the Constitution, the Bill
of Rights, and the Civil War Amendments. Here and throughout the
book, the editors provide notes illuminating details from the writings
of contemporaneous primary actors, scholarly critique of issues before
the Court, or related developments. For students interested in the
origins of the Bill of Rights, for instance, the editors suggest by their
excerpts and footnotes that the most direct antecedents for such rights
appeared in the constitutions that the colonists framed at the outbreak
of the American Revolution. 3 That note is replete with references to
the 1787 Federal Convention records and the writings of James
Madison. 4  Finally, the note confronts the grave constitutional
problems arising from the Constitution's recognition and sanction of
slavery.'5 Chapter 1, then, sets the tone for the remainder of the
casebook: the editors provide extensive raw materials, allowing the
teacher and students to do with them what they will.
Chapter 2 introduces the doctrine of judicial review. Again, rather
than simply throwing students into the bowels of Marbury v. Madi-
son,'6 the editors begin with a short historical note including excerpts
from Max Farrand.17 In this note, students learn something of the
flavor of the debates which occurred that summer in Philadelphia and
that the original Constitution did not explicitly assign a power of
judicial review to the Court. That information enables students to
study Marbury in context and to examine it for its essential purpose
and point:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular
cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two
13. Id. at 19 nn.6-7.
14. Id. at 20 nn.9-14.
15. Id. at 20-22 & accompanying notes.
16. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 26-34.
17. Farrand was the leading scholar on the Constitutional Convention. See MAX FARRAND,
THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (1911).
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laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the
operation of each."8
Marbury is a challenging case also because of the numerous asides
raised by Chief Justice John Marshall on his way to pronouncing the
Federalist theory of judicial review. Rather than make these points
explicitly, the editors illustrate them through a series of comments
from other cases, scholarly works, and law reviews."
The rest of the casebook sets out how the Court has used this
enormous interpretive power during the past two centuries to tell the
nation what provisions of our Constitution mean. I make this
observation explicit to my students. We will study what the Court has
said about various clauses of the Constitution through their decisions.
I make no attempt to teach them the meaning of every word found in
the Constitution. My hope is that they leave the course with a mastery
of how the Court approaches constitutional analysis, as well as an
ability to use the language from the covered cases to resolve hypotheti-
cal controversies. Toward this goal, I continue to use Cohen and Varat
because the authors' fine editing almost always retains the decisive
segments of the majority and dissenting opinions.
In addition, by necessity, I have found that I can omit entire
sections or chapters, without significant consequence. In earlier
editions, Professor Barrett would suggest pages for omission in limited
courses, a feature that I wish the editors would bring back. I have
learned the hard way that for time-limited courses like mine, it is
simply not possible to cover 1900 pages. I intend to cover about 1200
pages, but rarely cover more than 1000. I trade off broader coverage
for detailed analysis and discussion, hoping that less is more.
Chapter 3, introducing federal jurisdiction issues, is one unit that
I often edit substantially. It is organized into three sections: (1)
Supreme Court Review of State Court Decisions, (2) Constitutional
Litigation Initiated in the Federal Courts-a panoply of Eleventh
Amendment and abstention problems-and (3) Article III and
Justiciability Issues. Usually, I drop most of the first two sections,
referring interested students to our advanced course on Federal
Jurisdiction. Moreover, in the third section on justiciability, I
emphasize standing and leave mootness, ripeness, and political question
cases for advanced courses. My view is simply that every student of
Constitutional Law needs an introduction to Article III's minimum
requirements, but that many of the broader issues concerning federal
18. COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 32.
19. Id. at 34-37.
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court jurisdiction are better left to specialized courses. Thus, after
Marbury and brief mention of Ex parte McCardle and Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, the next major discussion is on justiciability, especially
standing.
Many of my students encounter difficulty with justiciability issues,
principally because they are quite unfamiliar and often the principles
seem imprecise and inconsistently applied. The editors set forth a
concise, well-written summary of these problems and explain how the
Court may use justiciability principles to expand or restrict the extent
of its impact.2" The editors make explicit the connection between
Marbury and the prohibition on rendering advisory opinions. They
then set forth the essential language from Chief Justice Warren's
opinion for the Court in Flast v. Cohen.2 Similar case abstracting
appears efficaciously throughout the casebook.
To their credit, the editors include sufficient portions of Warth v.
Seldin,22 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop-
ment Corp.,23 Craig v. Boren,24 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,25 and
Raines v. Byrd26 to enable teachers to elicit the constitutional doctrine,
while also elucidating the imprecision and contradictions reflected in
the opinions. If I had more course time, I would assign the fine
introductory materials on mootness, ripeness, and political questions.
Occasionally, I have assigned one case from each area, usually DeFunis
v. Odegaard,27 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,28 and Powell v. McCor-
mack.29  Because the facts of these cases are controversial, I have
never been able to cover the material in one class meeting and therefore
generally omit them entirely.
Part Two of the casebook, Chapters 4 through 7, focuses on the
constitutional allocation of governmental powers, underscoring that
principal concern of the 1787 Constitutional Convention delegates.
The editors deftly present cases and notes covering (1) the scope of the
national power, (2) the scope of state power, (3) intergovernmental and
20. Id. at 81.
21. 392 U.S. 83 (1968), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 82-83.
22. 422 U.S. 490 (1975), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 84-93.
23. 429 U.S. 252 (1977), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 93-95.
24. 429 U.S. 190 (1976), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 97-100.
25. 504 U.S. 555 (1992), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 101-06.
26. 117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997), reprinted in WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN D. VARAT,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1-10 (10th ed. Supp. 1997) [hereinafter
COHEN & VARAT, SUPP.].
27. 416 U.S. 312 (1974), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 106-09.
28. 461 U.S. 95 (1983), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 116-23.
29. 395 U.S. 486 (1969), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 126-29.
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federalism issues, and (4) separation of powers. As I have found with
Part One, the second part is well planned and concisely edited, and it
contains many helpful prefatory and historical notes. For example,
Chapter 4 begins with a series of excerpts from the 1787 Constitutional
Convention to provide students with a window to the deliberations and
compromises that produced our federal constitutional framework. The
notes are not simply sidebars, but rather prepare the reader for the
issues decided in McCulloch v. Maryland,3" Gibbons v. Ogden,3 and
Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia.32
The new edition includes some long-overdue pruning here.
Rather than retain a synopsis of most of the cases decided between
1880 and 1940, the editors use a portion of Justice Kennedy's opinion
from United States v. Lopez to summarize the primary points of those
cases. 33 Then they set out the modern commerce power cases: Heart
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,34 Katzenbach v. McClung,3S
and United States v. Lopez.36  This approach works well. The
students do not become bogged down unnecessarily in intricate details
of old cases with little modern relevance. In addition, the emphasis on
Lopez illustrates for students the current divisions within the Court
over the nature and scope of the commerce power. The editors include
judicious portions of the diverse opinions of the Justices so readers can
decide for themselves who presents the most persuasive arguments.
This is another consistent feature of the book; students must reach
their own conclusions about the materials.
After setting out the landmark cases on commerce power, the
editors include a series of short discussions on the nature and scope of
other federal powers, such as the taxing, spending, war and treaty, and
property powers.37 I skip that material in favor of constructing the
links between the scope of the national powers doctrine and the scope
of the state powers cases in Chapter 5. I review such cases as New
Enegry Co. of Indiana v. Limbach,3' Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madi-
son, Wisconsin,39 and Maine v. Taylor4" to teach how the Commerce
30. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 157-64.
31. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 167-74.
32. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 177-80.
33. See COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 185-90.
34. 397 U.S. 241 (1964), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 193-96.
35. 379 U.S. 294 (1964), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 196-98.
36. 514 U.S. 549 (1995), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 198-215.
37. COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 215-40.
38. 486 U.S. 269 (1988), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 247-51.
39. 340 U.S. 349 (1951), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 274-77.
40. 477 U.S. 131 (1986), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 309-12.
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Clause acts to limit some state regulations affecting interstate com-
merce. Over the years, I have cut back substantially the amount of
class time spent on the dormant Commerce Clause cases. At most, I
want my students to recognize the issue, not necessarily know every
permutation of the doctrine. Overall, I continue to think this chapter
is unnecessarily long, requiring some of the effective pruning that has
occurred elsewhere. I would begin by eliminating most of the truck
size and weight cases, which now seem obsolete given increasing
federal regulation in these areas noted by the editors.4
Beyond reviewing the broad implications of the Commerce Clause
on state regulatory power, the editors also set out in Chapter 5 leading
cases on the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, the
Twenty-First Amendment, and the Supremacy Clause. The editors
include sufficient cases and notes for an introduction to each topic,
although I often omit these topics altogether. Again, the casebook is
nicely adaptable to many course variations.
Chapter 6 has had one substantial revision: the inclusion in the
supplement of an extensive excerpt from the Brady Gun Control Case
(Printz v. United States).42 The editors are quite efficient here,
effectively highlighting the sharp disagreement within the Court since
the mid-1970s over federalism questions arising in cases where states
claim that federal regulations exceed constitutional authority. The
editors rely on Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,43
New York v. United States," and Printz v. United States45 to illus-
trate the fierce struggle within the Court to articulate a clear, workable
standard to resolve such disputes.
Chapter 7 completes the second part of the book, exposing readers
to separation-of-powers issues arising among the three branches of the
national government. The editors make no attempt to be exhaustive
here. The materials are introductory and quite selective, focusing
primarily on the division of power between the President and
Congress. Despite this brevity, the editors include interesting, useful
materials. One high point is the way they take the reader back to
April 1952 when President Truman issued Executive Order 10340,
seizing all the steel mills. The editors summarize the background
controversy, including references to the fullest scholarly accounts.46
41. COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 271-72.
42. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, SUPP., supra note 26, at 27-46.
43. 469 U.S. 528 (1985), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 376-87.
44. 505 U.S. 144 (1992), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 387-406.
45. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, SUPP., supra note 26, at 27.
46. COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 408-09 & n.a.
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Then the student can read portions of Justice Hugo Black's opinion
from the Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 7 case, and selected
excerpts from others, including Chief Justice Fred Vinson's dissent,
and need not read the entire 130-page opinion.
The remainder of the chapter presents other conflicts between
Congress and the President over international agreements, declaration
of war, the exercise of such powers as a legislative veto, and presiden-
tial and congressional immunities. I have rarely included these
materials in my course, simply encouraging interested students to skim
those pages or to use them as a starting point for additional research.
Chapters 8 through 12, Part Three of the casebook, contain over
700 pages principally discussing the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses, areas which have exploded during the life of this casebook.
Although early editions contained no materials on gender discrimina-
tion, for example, nor much coverage of what we now call the right to
privacy, the book has evolved to reflect the changing landscape. The
central issue posited by the editors in this area is the "definition of the
proper judicial role in giving content to the vague language of the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.""
Chapter 8 presents the interrelationship between the Bill of Rights
and the Civil War Amendments, focusing on the Court's early
interpretations of each in Barron v. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore,49 and the Slaughter-House Cases."°  Next, the editors
introduce the incorporation debate, as expressed in Palko v. Connecti-
cut,"' Adamson v. California,52 and Duncan v. Louisiana3 to illus-
trate the competing incorporation theories and how the selective
incorporation doctrine prevailed. A nice feature is the note summariz-
ing the leading cases where the Court held that various provisions of
the Bill of Rights also limit state governmental restrictions.5 4 The
reader again finds throughout the chapter familiar prefatory and
historical notes, revealing interesting background material and
comments by Justices such as the colloquy between Justices Samuel
Chase and James Iredell in Calder v. Bull regarding the possibility of
47. 343 U.S. 579 (1952), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 408-15.
48. COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 458.
49. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 463-66.
50. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 466-78.
51. 302 U.S. 319 (1937), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 482-85.
52. 332 U.S. 46 (1947), discussed in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 485-89.
53. 391 U.S. 145 (1968), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 490-98.
54. COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 501-03.
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nontextual constitutional constraints stemming from principles of
natural law."5
I follow Chapter 8 with Chapter 12 to introduce students to state
action and discussions of congressional powers under the Enabling
Clauses of Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment,
before the students try to tackle specific due process and equal
protection cases. I then cover Chapters 9 and 11, completing
substantive and procedural due process, before starting equal protec-
tion. I share this not so much as a criticism of how the editors
organize these chapters, but rather to illustrate that one can deviate
from their layout.
Chapter 9 is a hefty 200 pages, reflecting the editors' effort to
introduce readers to the landmark cases interpreting the Due Process,
Contract, and Just Compensation Clauses, especially the debate among
Justices concerning the substantive scope of those provisions. The
material covering state economic regulation is illustrative of the quality
throughout this chapter. Students find a brief prefatory note, then
another historical summary of the Court's early interpretations leading
up to Lochner v. New York. 6 Following the excerpts from the
opinions of Justices Rufus Peckham, John Marshall Harlan, and Oliver
Wendell Holmes, and a brief summary of cases decided between 1905
and 1934, the editors use Nebbia v. New York,57 United States v.
Carolene Products,8 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.,"
and Ferguson v. Skrupa60 to demonstrate the dramatic shift away from
Lochner, at least in the economic regulation cases. I appreciate the
concise case excerpts, although the editors miss an excellent opportuni-
ty to underscore the larger significance of Muller v. Oregon,6' relegat-
ing it to a note.
The materials on impairment of contracts and takings-United
States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey62 Allied Structural Steel
55. Id. at 459-60.
56. 198 U.S. 45 (1905), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 507-12.
57. 291 U.S. 502 (1934), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 514-16.
58. 304 U.S. 144 (1938), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 517-19.
59. 348 U.S. 483 (1955), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 520-22.
60. 372 U.S. 726 (1963), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 522-24.
61. 208 U.S. 412 (1986), discussed in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 512. That
decision, under the guise of protective legislation, extended occupational discrimination and
segregation against women through the 1960s, based on stereotypical views about the physical
differences, abilities, and proper roles of women. The case provides a lively comparison to
Lochner v. New York.
62. 431 U.S. 1 (1977), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 525-32.
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Co. v. Spannaus,"3 Energy Resources Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power &
Light Co.,64 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,6s and Dolan v.
City of Tigard"6 -are well-edited introductions, but time rarely allows
me to include them. Instead, I cover in more detail the far more
controversial cases on personal liberty and privacy cases ranging from
Griswold v. Connecticut,67 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio,61
and Zablocki v. Redhail6 to Roe v. Wade,7" Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,7  Bowers v. Hardrick, and
Washington v. Glucksberg.73  These cases tend to evoke strong
responses from the students, some wondering where a right to privacy
comes from, while others lament the Court's refusal to interpret the
Due Process Clause more expansively. The editors have not chosen
sides, instead providing raw materials that reflect the sharp interpretive
division among the Justices. The breadth of the case segments enables
readers to discern where different Justices line up, and whether they
have remained consistent or changed positions over time. The editors
also set out fewer notes here, for example, not describing the two
dozen significant abortion cases decided between Roe and Casey, or the
debate over a right to die and euthanasia. While I agree that the
emphasis on Casey is correct, a note placing Glucksberg in context
would be valuable.
Chapter 10 follows the pattern of Chapter 9, running over 300
pages. Equal protection cases are divided between economic regulation
cases and those meriting heightened scrutiny because they involve
arguably suspect classifications or they burden fundamental interests.
I want my students to recognize the similarities and differences
between the Court's analysis of due process versus equal protection
challenges to economic regulations. I also want them to understand
that one case may implicate both clauses. The editors illustrate these
points immediately, following the introductory note with a second
excerpt from the Lee Optical case and the recent decision in FCC v.
63. 438 U.S. 234 (1978), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 532-38.
64. 459 U.S. 400 (1983), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 538-41.
65. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 542-57.
66. 512 U.S. 374 (1994), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 557-67.
67. 381 U.S. 479 (1965), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 571-77.
68. 431 U.S. 494 (1977), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 578-84.
69. 434 U.S. 374 (1978), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 584-90.
70. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 605-17.
71. 505 U.S. 833 (1992), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 617-44.
72. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 645-55.
73. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, SUPP., supra note 26, at 57-76.
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Beach Communications, Inc.74 Section 3, the core of the chapter,
contains a series of subsections addressing various nuances of equal
protection doctrine. The principal cases are Loving v. Virginia,7"
Plessy v. Ferguson,76 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,77 Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,7" Missouri v. Jenkins,79
Craig v. Boren,"° United States v. Virginia,8 Washington v. Davis, 2
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,83 Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke, 4 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 85
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,8 6 and Romer v. Evans.8 7  The
current edition revises several of these units, dropping a large portion
of outdated note cases. While more pruning would help, what remains
is not too cumbersome, showing constitutional doctrine in action over
a series of cases. Moreover, the principal cases are expertly edited,
including for the reader the essential passages that disclose the grounds
of difference between the Justices.
The weakest section of the casebook, which I think begs for a
complete overhaul, is the unit on voting, especially those materials
relating to legislative districting. The editors do incorporate Miller v.
Johnson"8 and a related note on racial gerrymandering 9 discussing
districting cases subsequent to Miller. However, the new materials are
located beside cases that are not factually or analytically similar. I
want my students to know how voting rights were denied to African
Americans and other women for most of our nation's history. I want
them to read about grandfather clauses, white primaries, poll taxes,
literacy tests, and other devices used to abridge voting rights. And I
want them to read Gomillion v. Lightfoot ° and United Jewish Organi-
zations v. Carey9 before they try to understand Miller. Here, quite
74. 508 U.S. 307 (1993), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 680-84.
75. 388 U.S. 1 (1967), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 692-96.
76. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 703-06.
77. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 706-09.
78. 402 U.S. 1 (1971), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 713-20.
79. 495 U.S. 33 (1990), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 734-39.
80. 429 U.S. 190 (1976), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 748-55.
81. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 771-84.
82. 426 U.S. 229 (1976), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 786-92.
83. 458 U.S. 718 (1982), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 816-20.
84. 438 U.S. 265 (1978), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 821-47.
85. 488 U.S. 469 (1989), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 847-67.
86. 515 U.S. 200 (1995), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 867-86.
87. 517 U.S. 620 (1996), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 915-25.
88. 515 U.S. 900 (1995), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 962-74.
89. COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 974-83.
90. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
91. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
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uncharacteristically, the editors fail to provide the raw materials
essential to understanding how the Court has interpreted the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments in voting cases. A final weakness
of this unit is that it in no way reflects contemporary scholarly debate
on these issues or the current, conservative Court's role in rewriting
nearly thirty years of constitutional precedent. These omissions will
undoubtedly cause some teachers to adopt other casebooks. So far, my
approach has been heavy supplementation. These issues are too
important for the thin, noncontextual treatment currently provided.
Chapters 11 and 12 succinctly introduce procedural due process
and state action issues. Many of my students have difficulty with the
relationship between substantive and procedural due process claims:
what interests are subject to procedural fairness standards? Are they
the same as those given substantive protection? What constitutes a
deprivation? What process is due, and when? I have not found that
my students can answer these questions from the raw materials
provided. One problem is that a crucial passage is omitted from Board
of Regents v. Roth.92 Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court explains
what definition the Justices had in mind for the term "liberty":
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the
liberty . . . guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], the term
has received much consideration and some of the included things
have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely
freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized
... as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.93
Without that passage, my students cannot recognize the Court's
recollection of Meyer v. Nebraska94 and, at least by implication, its
reliance on Griswold and its progeny. I am unaware of any pedagogical
reasons to omit this excerpt, so I usually provide it by handout,
expecting my students then to compare substantive and procedural due
process interests. This sort of editing of a principal case is a rarity in
this casebook.
Before moving on to state action, there are at least three other
important concerns with the due process materials. First, the editors
92. 408 U.S. 564 (1972), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1069-73.
93. Roth, 408 U.S. at 572.
94. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
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set out prison regulation cases such as Sandin v. Conner" and Daniels
v. Williams96 without explaining if those cases are controlling beyond
the prison context. My students need to know what constitutes a
deprivation outside of prison, conceding that within it, many due
process interests are circumscribed. Second, if Mathews v. Eldridge97
sets out the classic general formulation of what process is due, readers
would benefit from more than a paragraph. Finally, the irrebuttable-
presumption cases cry out for a note on the implications, if any, of
Michael H. v. Gerald D.,98 especially its effect on Vlandis v. Kline99
and Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,'00 as well as a brief
discussion regarding the continuing vitality of the conclusive presump-
tion doctrine. Currently, these raw materials raise more questions than
they answer.
Chapter 12 recaptures all of the best qualities of the casebook, the
useful prefatory and historical notes and a series of well-edited cases.
Here, the reader can again work through the core materials and arrive
at individual conclusions. The editors describe the materials as a
collection of those issues raised in the Civil Rights Cases:' the
scope of Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment and Sections 1 and
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. I use the chapter to illustrate the
evolution of the state action doctrine as articulated by Justice Joseph
Bradley in the Civil Rights Cases, and later refined in Shelley v.
Kramer,.. 2 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,1"3 Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Irvis,10 4 and Reitman v. Mulkey. 5  The editors also
provide an effective summary of the surviving Reconstruction era civil
rights statutes and an interpretive note illustrating their modern
dimensions. I am rarely able to cover the interesting constitutional
questions raised by City of Rome v. United States °6 and City of
Boerne v. Flores,'0 7 but I always try to compare their treatment of
95. 515 U.S. 472 (1995), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1077-84.
96. 474 U.S. 327 (1986), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1086-89.
97. 424 U.S. 319 (1976), discussed in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1091.
98. 491 U.S. 110 (1989), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 591 (citing case
on p. 1100 and referencing the report on p. 591).
99. 412 U.S. 441 (1973), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1091-93.
100. 414 U.S. 632 (1974), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1093-97.
101. 109 U.S. 3 (1883), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1101-07.
102. 334 U.S. 1 (1948), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1116-20.
103. 365 U.S. 715 (1961), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1125-27.
104. 407 U.S. 163 (1972), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1130-35.
105. 387 U.S. 369 (1967), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1139-44.
106. 446 U.S. 156 (1980), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1163-73.
107. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, SUPP., supra note 26, at 82-92.
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federalism and scope of the national power with that in such earlier
cases as Lopez and Printz.
Part Four, the final unit, provides a close look at constitutional
protection of expression and religious conscience. Chapters 13 through
16 concern myriad speech issues, while Chapter 17 takes the reader
through a limited number of establishment and free-exercise cases.
Overall, the raw materials here provide a good introduction, with an
emphasis on the meaning of the Free Speech Clause. Although they
cannot match the more complete works focusing solely on First
Amendment cases, the editors include enough of the principal cases to
illustrate for students in survey courses many of the jurisprudential and
doctrinal questions that those larger works treat in detail.
I use Chapter 13 to demonstrate to my students, borrowing a line
from Stanley Fish, "there is no such thing as free speech.""1 8  The
editors illustrate nicely, through an informative historical introduction,
the numerous ways that state and federal government have sought to
control the content of expression. While the editors include a good
number of Espionage and Smith Act cases,1"9 I focus on Brandenburg
v. Ohio"'0 to distinguish advocacy of an idea from advocacy of
imminent, lawless action. Then I summarily treat vagueness,
overbreadth, and prior restraint issues in Coates v. Cincinnati,"1' Near
v. Minnesota,"2 and the accompanying notes on parade and demon-
stration permit systems.
The remaining cases, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,"3 Miller
v. California,"4 Cohen v. California,115 and Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,"6 as well as related cases
showing the application of their standards, allow readers to observe the
Court's shift away from its categorical analysis of content-based
regulations. This movement is best exemplified in R.A. V. v. City of
St. Paul, Minnesota,17 which might obliterate prior doctrine that
some speech is "of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from [it] is clearly outweighed by the
108. STANLEY FISH, THERE Is No SUCH THING As FREE SPEECH (1994).
109. COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1198-1224.
110. 395 U.S. 444 (1969), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1224-27.
111. 402 U.S. 611 (1971), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1233-36.
112. 283 U.S. 697 (1931), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1242-45.
113. 376 U.S. 254 (1964), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1250-54.
114. 413 U.S. 15 (1973), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1278-82.
115. 403 U.S. 15 (1971), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1291-93.
116. 447 U.S. 557 (1980), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1342-48.
117. 505 U.S. 377 (1992), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1318-34.
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social interest in order and morality.""' 8  The editors could easily
enhance this section with an interpretive note on the impact of R.A. V
or the inclusion of some recent scholarly references.
In Chapter 14, the editors set forth the basic time, place, and
manner regulation principles governing traditional public fora,
nontraditional public fora, private premises, and schools, as well as
restraints on using public funds for abortion-related activities.
Illustrative cases, Frisby v. Schultz,"9 Madsen v. Women's Health
Center, Inc.,12° Adderly v. Florida,121 International Society of Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,122 City of Ladue v. Gillee,12 1 Consolidated
Edison Co. of New York v. Public Service Commission,124 Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District, 2S and Rust v. Sul-
livan,126 highlight these partially revised units. I think the exclusion
of Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators Association127
obfuscates the reader's general understanding of this set of cases by
omitting the clearest summary of the three analytical standards for
traditional public fora, designated public fora, and nonpublic fora. The
materials would also improve from a contemporary assessment of
recent scholarly writing on cases like Madsen, Rust, and Ladue.
Chapter 15 contains a diverse collection of cases discussing
symbolic speech, compelled affirmation of belief, freedom of associa-
tion, and First Amendment problems arising from governmental
regulation of elections or governmental employees, under the heading,
"Penumbral First Amendment Rights." I usually do not have time to
cover these materials, but the editors include many of the most
interesting principal cases, especially United States v. O'Brien,'28
Texas v. Johnson,2 ' Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,3' West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette,"' and NAACP v. Alabama. 32
The limited notes here are more case-specific than earlier ones that
118. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
119. 487 U.S. 474 (1988), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1361-67.
120. 512 U.S. 753 (1994), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1367-77.
121. 385 U.S. 39 (1966), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1378-80.
122. 505 U.S. 672 (1992), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1380-93.
123. 512 U.S. 43 (1994), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1393-98.
124. 447 U.S. 530 (1980), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1403-07.
125. 393 U.S. 503 (1969), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1409-12.
126. 500 U.S. 173 (1991), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1428-38.
127. 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983).
128. 391 U.S. 367 (1968), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, 1439-42.
129. 491 U.S. 397 (1989), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1442-49.
130. 501 U.S. 560 (1991), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1449-55.
131. 319 U.S. 624 (1943), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1455-56.
132. 357 U.S. 449 (1958), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1457-58.
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traced terrain before and after the primary cases. At bottom, as with
Chapter 14, this edition's iteration of Chapter 15 has not changed
much, save moving a couple of the post-1995 cases like McIntyre v.
Ohio Elections Commission'33 into the main volume.
Chapter 16 deals with the dynamic issues arising from application
of First Amendment protections to print and electronic media, an
expected growth area in light of the Internet. The editors set out
excerpts from Justice Potter Stewart and Chief Justice Warren Burger
to frame the fundamental question regarding the scope of the Free
Press Clause. What does it add to the Free Expression Clause? The
reader must work through a half-dozen cases to decide whether Stewart
or Burger got it right or whether there is a third view. I do not teach
these materials, although the editors include sufficient excerpts and
notes for a thin introduction to restraints on editorial judgment,
confidential sources, press access to trials, and restrictions in electronic
media. The best materials here are the carefully edited opinions from
the Pentagon Papers Cases,'34 revealing the Court's difficult task of
not abdicating its duty to say what the Constitution means, while, at
the same time, not going beyond the Court's judicial function. The
new edition also incorporates the DAETC case, 3' Turner Broadcast-
ing System, Inc. v. FCC,'36 and Reno v. ACLU,'37 the most recent
decisions from the last two terms addressing whether cable and
Internet regulations exceeded constitutional limits.
In Chapter 17, the editors present the leading Establishment
Clause and Free Exercise Clause materials, demonstrating the uneasy
tension arising from attempts to meet the commands of each clause.
How does government remain neutral on religious matters? Do these
clauses require accommodation, noncoercion, or something else? This
edition effectively retains a few of the older landmarks, such as Everson
v. Board of Education,' Zorach v. Clauson,'39 Sherbert v. Ver-
ner,140 and Wisconsin v. Yoder,14 and incorporates sufficient seg-
ments of almost all the significant new cases since 1989, including
133. 514 U.S. 334 (1995), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1518-25.
134. 403 U.S. 713 (1971), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1565-70.
135. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996),
reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1601 (citing case on p. 1061 and referencing the
report on p. 1293).
136. 117 S. Ct. 1174 (1997), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, SUPP., supra note 26, at 124-38.
137. 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, SUPP., supra note 26, at 93-107.
138. 330 U.S. 1 (1947), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1602-07.
139. 343 U.S. 306 (1952), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1608-11.
140. 374 U.S. 398 (1963), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1688-91.
141. 406 U.S. 205 (1972), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1691-95.
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Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,'42 Lee
v. Weisman,'43 City of Allegheny v. ACLU,'44 Capitol Square Review
and Advisory Board, Pinette,45 Agostini v. Felton,'46 Rosenberger
Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,'47 Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 48
Church of the Lukumi; Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,' and
City of Boerne.5° These materials provide a brief glimpse at the
competing interpretive philosophies currently employed by members
of the Court, revealing numerous future battlegrounds within the
Court and between the Court and Congress. The reader is left with
the sense that much of the same angst seen in the sharp split in
Everson still confounds the Court's interpretation of these mysterious
clauses.
Finally, the editors have continued in this edition the excellent
chart on the Court's membership, allowing readers to identify the
composition of the Court at any specified time. Students can thereby
track changes in personnel and constitutional doctrine.
III. THE 21ST CENTURY CASEBOOK
While I continue to think Cohen and Varat is one of the leading
traditional casebooks, I have noted some weaknesses, places that are
uneven in quality, and the editors' failure to incorporate the challeng-
ing new voices that offer precise critiques of constitutional doctrine as
a tool that maintains existing hierarchies of oppression.' Below, I
want to briefly explore some broader pedagogical concerns about
casebooks, looking to the next century.
Since it does not appear that law schools are poised to abandon the
casebook, those of us who use or write them must ask more questions
about the ways casebooks might serve our teaching goals. Who is the
principal audience? My students tell me that the casebooks are too
dense, too boring, too hard to read, and so on. Many of them cannot
find the law in them. They remind me of myself and my classmates
142. 508 U.S. 384 (1993), discussed in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1607-08.
143. 505 U.S. 577 (1992), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1611-21.
144. 492 U.S. 573 (1989), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1627-38.
145. 515 U.S. 753 (1995), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1638-46.
146. 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, SUPP., supra note 26, at 139-54.
147. 515 U.S. 819 (1995), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1676-86.
148. 494 U.S. 872 (1990), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1695-1705.
149. 508 U.S. 520 (1993), discussed in COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 1705-06.
150. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), reprinted in COHEN & VARAT, SUPP., supra note 26, at 82-92.
151. See, e.g., STEPHANIE WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED 28 (1996).
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not so long ago. Because I observe my students hard at work, I know
there is a larger problem: time. I do not think students have enough
time to do what teachers expect of them. They cannot read cases as
fast as we can. They do not know what to look for in cases the way
we do. They have not read enough cases to recognize the standard
parts of virtually every case. If casebooks are teaching tools, why don't
they teach more, especially beginning students, the landscape of law?
Why not include sample briefs of the first several cases? After my
students read the first case, I give them a sample brief, explaining how
I constructed it by asking questions about the case. I tell them it is
only a sample, that they should compare it with their own. I
encourage them to take notes as they read the cases and then to go
back and write briefs. But, frankly, I have been at this enterprise a
short time and I would benefit from the thinking of others who been
at it for decades. Casebook editors seem well situated to make their
materials more teachable.
Another longstanding criticism of casebook and law review authors
is that too often they cite the work of a narrow group, namely white
men citing other white men. A related concern is how well casebook
editors keep up with the explosion in modern scholarly legal writing
and the diversity of that scholarship. Critical legal theories, whether
centered on race, gender, economics, or other political theories, have
moved from the jurisprudential margins, requiring traditional
casebooks to take note, especially of their impact in constitutional
decision-making. In my mind, aging casebooks that do not stay
current with interpretive, supplemental material will quickly lose their
primacy in the academy. A key difference between aging leading
casebooks and the newest ones is the freshness of the latter and
frequent staleness of the former, reflected at least partly in the recent
editors' efforts to present and discuss the landmark cases juxtaposed
with some of the most influential recent scholarly commentary,
including writing by white women and scholars of color.
For limited purposes of this review, I have compared Cohen and
Varat with three other casebooks: Farber, Eskridge, and Frickey;15 2
Stone, Seidman, Sunstein, and Tushnet;153 and Lively, Haddon,
Roberts, and Weaver."' For convenience, I will refer to them by the
lead author's last name. The Farber editors, self-described as "three
152. DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, THEMES FOR THE
CONSTITUTION'S THIRD CENTURY (1993).
153. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1996).
154. DONALD E. LIVELY ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, HISTORY, AND
DIALOGUES (1997).
1998]
Seattle University Law Review
bland middle class white men," explain early their need to incorporate
the views of others:
Though one of us (Farber) is a Jew and one of us (Eskridge) is a
gay man, we have not experienced exclusion in the same ways as
women, lesbians, Asians, African Americans, Hispanics, and Native
Americans. Partly for this reason, in our treatment of discrimina-
tion-related issues, we have relied less on our own textual exposition
of different points (as we do in most of the book), and more on
excerpting the views of scholars whose work reflects other perspec-
tives. "I
This confession is significant, telling the reader that the editors have
great expertise in some areas, but that in others they do not, necessitat-
ing their reliance on other scholars who perhaps express views with
which the editors do not agree. The students receive the benefit of
exposure to competing contemporary visions of how the Court has
resolved diverse issues. While it is the editors' prerogative to
determine what raw and supplemental material to include in each
revision, it seems counter-intuitive to exclude recent scholarly
references, for example, on the meaning of the Ninth Amendment.
Whatever a reader's ideological preference, it is helpful if the reader
encounters what scholars are writing about a particular clause or
problem now, not only thirty years ago. On this score, generally,
Farber, Stone, and Lively all appear more current and more diverse,
thus offering intellectual challenges over Cohen and Varat.' 56
I think Stone is especially rich because of the vigorous collabora-
tion of its four superb editors and all of their assistants. When one
scans Stone's list of excerpt acknowledgments, it reads like a Who's
Who of the legal academy.5 7 Not only does it reflect ideological
diversity, but also a conscientious effort to combine contemporaneous
and contemporary thought about the raw materials. My suspicion is
that the addition of one or two more editors would allow Cohen and
Varat to close this growing intellectual gap quickly.
Another exciting feature in some recent casebooks is the attempt
to ground students more in the practical issues of lawyering, for
example in illustrating through a representative case how litigation
155. FARBER ET AL., supra note 152, at vii n.4.
156. My review of these other casebooks has not been exhaustive and I cannot say that any
of them teaches better than COHEN & VARAT. I do think that they have done a better job of
incorporating the freshest scholarship. Compare COHEN & VARAT, supra note 1, at 570-77 and
accompanying notes, with STONE ET AL., supra note 153, at 941-55 and accompanying notes;
FARBER ET AL., supra note 152, at 494-503; and LIVELY ET AL., supra note 154, at 101-03.
157. STONE ET AL., supra note 153, at xxxv-lviii.
[Vol. 21:859
Cohen and Varat
proceeds to the Court. Many of my students display an interest in
how the Court operates and reaches decisions, information readily
available from former clerks and Court watchers like Cohen and Varat.
A few well placed notes could set out such information without
substantially increasing the text's size. Another approach might be to
add an Appendix.
I also like to have my students apply what they learn to hypotheti-
cals as we proceed through the materials. With my first-year students,
I distribute as many as ten practice questions which I encourage them
to complete. I try to illustrate how they might marshall material from
the cases to resolve the hypos. Derrick Bell has effectively incorporat-
ed simulated exercises in his casebook, allowing students to do law,
find it, read it, and argue it, rather than simply read cases."' As a
new teacher, I would benefit from the experience of some of the
classroom veterans, not so much from a teaching manual, but a set of
materials that incorporates effective participatory exercises, helping
students build their confidence before the exam.
Finally, I want to say a word about personal staleness which can
arise from staying with the same casebook too long. Having learned
that Cohen and Varat teaches well, I now think changing casebooks
occasionally can have enormous benefits for both students and teachers.
Although I am glad I chose Cohen and Varat initially, and while I
recommend it for new teachers, I think it is a mistake to stay with one
book for too long, especially when newer books often supplement the
core materials with the latest critiques of the law, as well as other
useful information.
The damage of staying with one book too long is perhaps greatest
to students who rely on earlier work summarized by another student.
I want my students to know how to brief cases, summarize materials,
and stand before their peers and advocate points. I don't want them
getting by on another students sketch, either because they are
overwhelmed by the demands of law school or because a topic is
particularly confounding. Since the value of summaries is in their
production, I want my students to create their own. Changing books
occasionally increases the likelihood of more individual work and thus
more complete learning.
We who teach these courses need the intellectual challenge of
occasionally starting over with a fresh set of readings and problems.
Changing casebooks can eliminate the tendency of faculty and students
to rely on old outlines from earlier presentations, rather than doing
158. BELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 8.
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original work. I am the first to admit that using the same casebook has
made class preparation less time consuming. But I must also admit
that unless I reread a case within a few days of the class discussion, I
inevitably miss important points of coverage.
CONCLUSION
Overall, I give Cohen and Varat high marks, perhaps a B+. My
highest compliment is that I continue to use it, primarily because I
have not yet seen a more complete book, one that is better written and
more readable, as carefully planned and edited, equally comprehensive
in principal cases and abstracts, and as student-friendly with prefatory
notes and relevant historical commentary. The editors, wisely I think,
have not written a casebook for all seasons, but rather one which
introduces its readers to many of the most salient questions of
constitutional doctrine. On the other hand, a key limitation of the
book is that as it has aged, its editors, in too many parts, have not
updated the supplemental materials, especially with references to
leading scholarly writing and debate, to reflect the vast array of new
schools of legal thought and criticism. Because these new jurispruden-
tial voices have taken their places in mainstream legal thought, their
omission narrows the educational experience and lessens the intellectual
challenge of the materials, undermining the editors' primary goal. This
is the book's only glaring weakness when it is compared with newer,
emerging casebooks.
In the end, the casebook can serve many purposes in legal
education. As we enter the next century, I hope more editors will
imagine broader, even more teachable casebooks. Each year, I find
new ways to use Cohen and Varat. It has served many of my
pedagogic goals and it remains worthy of broad consideration and use.
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